Rossi v. Darden developments - Part 1

  • There are many scattered threads with news and commentary about the lawsuit, Rossi v. Darden. This thread is created to hold news and commentary on the case, specifically. I will edit this post, as I have time, to link to other relevant threads, and will add news about the case here. If anyone desires extensive discussion, a new thread may be created and linked from here.

    This is not systematic, just adding links as I notice them:

    Rossi vs IH: (Update: Sep. 9 20– James A. Bass now a Third Party in IH’s Counter Complaint)
    Leonardo's Motion to Dismiss

  • Document 52:

    I had expected this would appear and wondered why it had not.

    Annesser was working for Silver Law Group, when Rossi v. Darden was filed.
    Patricia Silver was the mainstay of the firm, with high experience.

    She would never, ever, say anything about the case, but my guess is that when she finally looked at it, her reaction was "get me out of here!" If she advised Rossi, it may have been advice he didn't like.

    Her name was on the initial filing, but that work was shoddy

    This is all speculation, of course. How involved the new lawyers are is unclear, Chaiken and Evans did appear at the discovery hearing before the Magistrate. Annesser has still written almost everything. We may never know what actually happened, unless, say, Rossi sues his lawyers.

    (I edited this to remove speculation about whether or not Annesser had actually left the Silver Law Group. I forgot that I'd seen the linked-in page in August, confirming that Silver Law Group was Annessers' former employer. The speculation here that Rossi made the change to PBYA because of their technology expertise would not explain why Annesser went there. I think it's the other way around. Annesser moved and Rossi simply kept his attorney. But this is speculation. So far, Annesser is doing almost all the work. And I remain unimpressed. Two and a half pages of legal arguments on fluff? I.e., the violation of the tax provisions of the Agreement, trivial to answer in a couple of sentences without a pile of authorities. In the end, what IH was doing with that -- and certain other claims -- is establishing a pattern of Rossi sloppiness about keeping agreements. Technical expertise is probably largely moot in this case, almost all the issues are legal.)

  • It is my understanding that more than one person (who told me by email) has written the Silver Law firm and has apprised them fully about Rossi's past criminal record. The emails also included concise explanations about why Rossi could not possibly be telling the truth about the ecat and that all ecats almost certainly did not work. Maybe they did some additional checking on their own and realized the whole case was a giant turkey that was going to turn around and bite them.

  • From ECW:


    LuFong: Looks more like Rossi's lawyers (Annesser, Chaiken) changed law firms from The Silver Law Group to PERLMAN, BAJANDAS, YEVOLI & ALBRIGHT, P.L. but maybe this also may amount to a change in law firms as well


    Ged: Seems you hit it smack dab in the nose changed groups in August according to his profile (looks like a jump up in his career too). Neither firm has updated their websites yet though.

  • List of posts in this series <--link

    Filed Friday, September 23, 2016. Newvortex filename is 0054.0_Rossi_Motion_to_Strike.pdf

    The full title is



    Plaintiffs, Andrea Rossi and Leonardo Corporation (“Plaintiffs”), hereby move pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 12(f) and Local Rule 7.1 for an order striking Defendants’ Second Amended Affirmative Defenses 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 and 10, and Paragraphs 126-133 of Count II of Defendants Second Amended Counterclaim titled “Failure to Pay Taxes” [DE: 50]. In the alternative, Defendants move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) and Local Rule 7.1 for a more definite statement of the affirmative defenses.

    These are my notes.

    To prepare for this, I read


    An affirmative defense to a civil lawsuit or criminal charge is a fact or set of facts other than those alleged by the plaintiff or prosecutor which, if proven by the defendant, defeats or mitigates the legal consequences of the defendant's otherwise unlawful conduct. In civil lawsuits, affirmative defenses include the statute of limitations, the statute of frauds, waiver, and other affirmative defenses such as those listed in Rule 8 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In criminal prosecutions, examples of affirmative defenses are self defense,[1] insanity, and the statute of limitations.

    Annesser recites legal standards:


    An affirmative defense may be stricken if it is insufficient as a matter of law. .... A legally
    sufficient affirmative defense ... gives “fair notice of the defense” and “the grounds upon which it rests.”

    “While [a party] need not provide detailed factual allegations, they must provide more than bare-bones conclusions. [A party] should not be left to discover the bare minimum facts constituting a defense until discovery. “[A] motion to strike an affirmative defense is typically denied unless the defense (1) has no possible relation to the controversy, (2) may cause prejudice to one of the parties, or (3) fails to satisfy the general pleading requirements of Rule 8.


    “Under this standard, an affirmative defense that merely offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”... Instead, a defense would have to contain enough factual matter to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, an affirmative defense is established only when ‘a defendant admits the essential facts of the complaint and sets up other facts in justification or avoidance.’”

    On the last point, is cited.


    B. Standard to Strike Other Immaterial Impertinent or Scandalous Matters.
    ... “The purpose of a motion to strike is to clean up the pleadings, streamline litigation, and avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial matters.”

    “The Court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a motion to strike.”

    Notwithstanding, “a court will not exercise its discretion under the rule to strike a pleading unless the matter sought to be omitted has no possible relationship to the controversy, may confuse the issues, or otherwise prejudice a party.”

    Annesser then moves


    ... to strike the Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses number 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 and 10 ...

    Notice that 5 and 8 are not included.
    From the Defendant's Second Amended Answer etc.:


    5. Plaintiffs’ claims are barred, in whole or in part, as a result of Plaintiffs’ antecedent breaches of contract. For example, Plaintiffs breached the License Agreement, prior to the breaches of contract alleged by Plaintiffs in the Complaint, by, inter alia, improperly disclosing the E-Cat IP and the terms of the License Agreement to unauthorized third parties, failing to assign certain patents and/or patent applications to IPH, failing to inform or consult with Industrial Heat and IPH on the existence of certain patent applications and failing to fully prosecute patent applications related to the E-Cat IP, failing to report and pay taxes on payments/revenue made under the License Agreement, and failing to keep the original Leonardo entity active. See Counterclaims and Third-Party Claims ¶¶ 11, 39-46, 64-83, 93-133 infra.

    This is actually core, prior breach by Leonardo, but the specific violations are not the most egregious (which would be failure to transfer working technology to IH as agreed.) Rossi also breached the Terms Sheet agreement by excluding the IH engineer, and this action, had the test been a GPT, would have damaged its reliability.


    8. Plaintiffs’ claims are barred, in whole or in part, because any injury that Plaintiffs may have suffered was proximately caused or contributed to by the acts or omissions of Plaintiffs and/or third parties other than Defendants. As reflected in Paragraphs 64, 71, 95, 101, 104 supra, Paragraphs 39-40, 69-76, 100-108 infra, and Ninth Defense infra, any purported “injury” to Plaintiffs relating to any alleged disclosure of the E-Cat IP or any “unjust enrichment”-type benefit allegedly conferred on Industrial Heat or IPH was a product of (1) their agreeing in the License Agreement to provide the E-Cat IP to Industrial Heat without any limitation on Industrial Heat’s ability and right to disclose the E-Cat IP to anyone it chose, (2) their relinquishing in the License Agreement any claim to any prior or collateral agreement not reflected in the License Agreement and the written documents referenced therein, (3) their disclosures in patent applications and otherwise, and (4) their decision to conduct operations in Florida under the fraudulently induced Term Sheet and after the “Guaranteed Performance” period under the License Agreement expired.

    I would have stated, at the end, "after the ... period ... expired and without any written agreement of the parties to a formal test.

  • From the Second Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses


    1. Plaintiff Leonardo lacks standing to bring any claims against Defendants because the assignment of the License Agreement from Leonardo Corporation, Inc., a New Hampshire corporation (“Leonardo New Hampshire”), to Plaintiff Leonardo was invalid. As explained in Paragraph 8 supra, Leonardo New Hampshire is the party to the License Agreement. Per the License Agreement and the First Amendment, Leonardo New Hampshire could not assign any Case rights under the License Agreement to anyone else, either “voluntarily, involuntarily, by operation of law or otherwise.” See Counterclaims and Third-Party Claims ¶ 44 infra. Rossi also lacks standing to bring the remaining breach of contract claim in the Complaint because the payment that is the basis of that claim (Count I) is due, if at all, to Leonardo New Hampshire, not Rossi. See Answer ¶¶ 74, 80 supra

    Before turning to Annesser's motion, this struck me at first as ridiculous. Okay, so Leonardo moved from New Hampshire to Florida. So what? However, this stands as another example of Rossi sloppiness. There are two corporations involved, one formed in New Hampshire and one in Florida. The default presumption is that these are different legal entities. What would overcome that?

    Taking this straight, the Agreement was between Rossi, Leonardo (New Hampshire), Ampenergo, and IH. It provided for payments to "Leonardo." On the face, there is a problem. The agreement prohibits "assignment" without permission from the other parties. However, there is a process for a corporation to move from one state to another. Was that process followed? The claim is made in note 1 of paragraph 8 of the Complaint:


    1 LEONARDO CORPORATION, a New Hampshire Corporation, was merged into LEONARDO CORPORATION, a Florida Corporation, wherein the Florida Corporation was the surviving entity.

    It might be relevant when this occurred, assuming it did occur. This would require the filing of a merge form with Florida (and maybe the dissolution of the New Hampshire corporation. I do not read the Agreement as providing that Leonardo Corporation may not move to another state, i.e,. form a new corporation and merge the original into it. As a complete merge, a full transfer of rights and responsibilities, the new corporation is effectively the same as the old. So, I can more or less anticipate Annesser's argument.

    Annesser takes three pages to address this. I'm appalled. As is often pointed out to me, brevity is the soul of wit. (but I'm not writing legal pleadings! "Wit," legally, is what will clearly and effectively communicate to a judge or jury what they need to know to make a decision. More can be less. In the other direction, it should be complete, but with no fluff.)

    The argument boils down to: this was a merger, not an assignment. Explaining the application of Florida law to this might take, if Annesser wants to be thorough, a couple of sentences. He has:


    If, on the other hand, Defendant is claiming that Leonardo NH assigned the License Agreement to Plaintiff Leonardo outside of the merger, such defense (a) fails to accept the allegations of the Complaint as true, and (b) fails to plead any factual basis for
    their conclusory allegation that such assignment was “invalid” thereby failing to satisfy the requisite pleading requirements.

    As I understand it, an Affirmative Defense need not accept that allegations of the complaint are true; that would be the rule for a Motion to Dismiss or to Strike. An Affirmative Defense may deny the allegations of the Complaint. However, I'm not seeing evidence in Defense 1. It does not raise the possibility of merger and deny that a merger took place. However, this is remediable, and so what I expect is that the judge will require that Defendants drop the first Affirmative Defense or amend it to allege that the shift was not a merger.

    The Agreement, however, clearly prohibits assignment without consent.

    If a merger took place, duly registered with Florida and with notice to IH, my opinion is that this would not require the consent of IH. This could have happened at any time before the filing of the Complaint. Further, if that was not satisfied, it would still be remediable. It would be inequitable to dismiss the suit on this technical ground, as long as it were remedied promptly. However, IH is not asking for dismissal, but raising a possible defense.

    Being "wrong" is not a ground for striking an Affirmative Defense, unless the error is not controversial, and the Rossi claim of "merger," as stated, is conclusory. The judge will not do internet research to find out the truth about dates and a merge document, but will rule based on what is filed by the parties. Most of Annesser's argument is belaboring the obvious, and arguing that the Defense is wrong.

    Such a fundamental matter as the standing of a plaintiff to sue should not have been left to a conclusory footnote. While it was not necessary to attach proof of merger, a specific, dated reference to acts of merger would have been enough. I cannot myself research the Florida situation today because the state corporation site is down until Monday.

    As part of this analysis, and as an educational exercise (for me!) I want to make predictions. I am not a lawyer, and I know a real lawyer who refuses to make predictions. With the original Motion to Dismiss, I predicted the outcome. On the core dismissal motion (Count 1) I correctly predicted that it would not be dismissed at that point. There were seven other counts; I predicted dismissal of all, and four were dismissed. So ... not bad. I give myself a B. On Count 1, I did suggest that the judge would require the plaintiff to amend to allege estoppel; instead, she inferred it (which was a bit more efficient, and I apply that precedent here.)

    So, prediction (which may shift if IH responds): the judge has three options.

    • sustain the motion to strike. I don't see this as possible at this point because Annesser has not alleged sufficient fact. I find it remarkable that with three pages, he doesn't simply say when the merger took place.
    • reject the motion, leaving AD 1 intact.
    • require IH to amend AD 1 to specifically address merger (yes or no! -- which could include "maybe, we don't know," which is then effectively "no merger established," or to withdraw the AD (presumably being satisfied that a merger took place).

    If there are other amendments to be required, she may toss this in the hopper. If not, there is more fuss involved in fixing this than it is worth. She will take the second course as keeping things simple. If an affirmative defense is wrong, and especially in this case, it would be easily handled by stipulation later or even, if necessary, at trial, but I doubt it would get that far. IH will not want to get up at trial and argue an indefensible position. Color that Dumb.

    IH notes that the corporations existed as separate entities during the events covered by the case. I do not see that as relevant, as long as there was merger before the filing. Further, even after filing, this would be a remediable defect, as I describe above.

  • From the Second Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses


    2. Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The bases for such are stated in Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [D.E. 17], Defendants’ reply on same [D.E. 19], and this pleading. See, e.g., First Defense supra.

    I would dislike this as a judge. I should not have to read large documents to extract the "bases" for this. However, here it is:

    D.E. 17, page 5 (see the original for legal authorities cited. There is original emphasis in bold. I have added emphasis to one line in bold italics.

    This has been much misunderstood. The Complaint as filed (and as it still stands) was blatantly defective. The Second Amendment was signed by IH and Rossi, but not by AEG, nor by Lenonardo Corporation, nor by IPH. The defect was remediable, as to Leonardo, possibly as to AEG, and not as to IPH, perhaps, but the IPH signature could be challenged as not necessary (and the same for Leonardo if Rossi wholly owns Leonardo, as IH does IPH). It is this defect that might be remedied by estoppel through the conduct of the parties, if other evidence shows defacto acceptance of an otherwise-proper Guaranteed Performance Test. The same is true of the Six Cylinder Unit issue. I.e, if IH did, in fact, agree to the Doral plant operating period as a "GPT," rather than something else, in particular a sale of power and demonstration installation for guests, this estoppel could be established and a later reliance on the strict letter of the Agreement would be inequitable.

    However, estoppel must be pled, and Rossi avoided this. Hence it is not surprising in the least that IH moved for dismissal on this basis. The judge, however, could have allowed Rossi to amend, and chose, instead, to simply infer estoppel. She postponed judgment on the "Six Cylinder Unit" issue, pending knowledge as to whether or not this was merely another name for "E-Cat Plant." Because it was possible that the arguments given above could be defeated with more evidence, she did not grant dismissal at that point. However, for whatever reason, IH did not emphasis what I have emphasized above, the issue of an agreement in writing to the start date. There is no allegation of such a writing, nor anything more than vague allusions to some possible agreement, not explicit. If the written agreement existed, one would have thought that it would have been placed in evidence, because it would entirely kill this issue; whereas, without it, the issue will kill Rossi v. Darden.

    At this point, Jones Day may consider the "Six Cylinder Unit" issue enough, given the judge's prior comment.

    Now, Annesser's motion....


    ... Defendants are simply attempting to re-litigate their Motion to Dismiss in hopes that they may achieve a different result. This Court has already determined that the Plaintiffs’ surviving claims sufficiently state a cause of action and Defendants should not be permitted a second bite at the apple so as to relitigate the same issues yet again under the guise of an affirmative defense. Accordingly, the defense must be stricken.

    I can be brief here. the Court ruled as described that plaintiff's claims sufficiently state a cause of action, if taken as entirely true. That is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Now the plaintiff is moving to strike this as an affirmative defense, which requires a similar assumption in the other direction: that the defendants factual claims are to be assumed to be true.

    Annesser claims that there are only conclusory statements. This is blatantly false.
    Facts were alleged

    • regarding the original agreement and setup of the GPT.
    • about the GPT not having taken place timely, by that standard.
    • about the second amendment and its signatures
    • about the requirement of the second amendment for a written agreement as to the date.
    • about the Six Cylinder unit
    • about the lack of evidence of agreement to start the test with some other Plant than the Six Cylinder Unit.

    Prediction: The motion to strike this Affirmative Defense will be denied.

  • From the Second Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses

    Because some have been complaining about "legalese," some terms:
    Equitable claims:…-and-equitable-claim.html / claims seeking relief by some action, injunction, or prohibition, as distinct from money damages. "Equity" generally refers to fairness.
    Estoppel: "Estoppel is the law's way of saying "you can't have your cake and eat it." If IH actually agreed to a GPT, and the conduct of the parties was consistent with that, IH might be estopped from claiming there was no GPT because of some technical defect.
    Waiver: the forgoing of some right or conduct signifying that the right has been abandoned. This can be similar to estoppel.
    Laches: "a lack of diligence and activity in making a legal claim, or moving forward with legal enforcement of a right, in particular with regard to equity; hence, it is an unreasonable delay that can be viewed as prejudicing the opposing [defending] party. When asserted in litigation, it is an equity defense, that is, a defense to a claim for an equitable remedy."

    The last sentence of the defense appears to be a reference to the claims of fraudulent representation as to the involvement of Cherokee and the availability of funding from Cherokee. The Agreement was explicit that it was with a new corporation, Industrial Heat, and it included a standard Entire Agreement clause. IH would claim that even if Rossi were deceived as to whom he was dealing with, in the year ensuing before he actually arranged Validation, and transferred the 1 MW Plant and, allegedly, the IP, he could have withdrawn from the agreement by refunding the $1.5 million, which he was allowed to do if he so chose. To assert this four years later is barred by laches, and also violates waiver and estoppel and the Statute of Frauds.

    Annesser finds the defense vague, and, in part, it still is, in my opinion, as to the first part. The reference to massive sections of the countercomplaint without specifics, I find confusing. The relation of the alleged fraudulent inducement to estoppel, waiver, and laches is obscure to me.

    However, In spite of his initial complaint, Annesser seems to have figured out what, at least, part of this is about:


    Logically, Plaintiffs were fraudulently induced to do something – enter into the License Agreement. Defendants now argue that their fraud should be ignored because they were successful in duping
    Plaintiffs to “sign on the dotted line.” There is no legal support for this position, and, accordingly, the defense must be stricken.

    Annesser is ignoring the very substantial lapse of time before Rossi alleges any complaint about whom he had the agreement with. He signed the agreement in 2012, it iincluded an "entire agreement clause," and he received the benefit of the Agreement as to not only the initial payment securing the agreement of $1.5 million, but the later $10 million and other, benefits (Including very substantial payments to his friends, Penon and Fabiani, and, as well increased credibility because of the involvement of IH. The signing of the agreement, with ample time to review it with an attorney, was a waiver of reliance on any prior representations. The delay was laches, it is unconscionable for Rossi to have benefited from the agreement for years, as-is, then to repudiate it based on his original misundertanding -- or even deception.

    The Annesser argument would make mincemeat of contract law. Yes. If a person realizes or comes to believe that he has been deceived, and this is important to him, he can generally back out of the agreement if this is promptly asserted. Rossi had a year before there were any relatively irrevocable events.


    ... Defendants fail to give Plaintiffs any notice – fair or otherwise – of the “other applicable equitable doctrines” upon which they intend to rely in this defense. Defendants merely assert that they rely upon “other applicable equitable doctrines.” [DE: 50 at *22]. Defendants fail to make any legal or factual allegation in support of this defense as they cannot do so in good faith.

    The failure to make a factual allegation in connection with that claim is one thing, the claim about the impossibility of doing so in good faith is reactive fluff.

    I am not familiar with the level of specificity required in these defenses. I've read plenty of cases, but not the initial pleadings, only judgments and sometimes some later arguments.

    Prediction: the Judge will reject the motion or will require that more specifics be alleged with regard to part of it or that those vague parts be striken. The point is that the plaintiff should be aware of the round outlines of the defense.

  • Taking this straight, the Agreement was between Rossi, Leonardo (New Hampshire), Ampenergo, and IH. It provided for payments to "Leonardo." On the face, there is a problem. The agreement prohibits "assignment" without permission from the other parties. However, there is a process for a corporation to move from one state to another. Was that process followed? The claim is made in note 1 of paragraph 8 of the Complaint:

    The merger (document) took place March 21, 2016, but was retroactive to January 1, 2015.
    Andrea Rossi is listed as President of Leonardo New Hampshire, but CEO of Leonardo Florida. (Which one (or both) is the one that Johnson is President of?)
    Both companies are reported on the merger document to be owned by the same person.
    The document is numbered P10000091220 (Florida).

    Annesser is the lawyer for the merger.

    It is possible that the New Hampshire Leonardo was dissolved before the merger, which is why the merger was made retroactive, but I would have to locate that document.

  • March 21, 2016, when the merger was carried out, is after the end of the purported GPT. I think this was done in a rush in response to something, but I don't recall what. How far back in time would the merger need to be to deal with IH's challenge of standing, and would January 1, 2015, be sufficient? I know that IH and Rossi started dealing in business several years before that. If the merger was initiated as late as 2016, will there be a basis for overruling the retroactive part? Could IH argue that it had a relevant interest in whether there was a merger or an assignment (or no assignment), apart from the question of standing for the lawsuit?

  • @Eric Walker,
    The timing of the merger paperwork is just about right for the ERV report completion.
    There may be some other NH-FL complications , but they need a closer look too.
    Seems like the FL Leonardo may have paid for some patent/application transfers (quite some time ago), which were part of the IH deal with the NH Leonardo. But following these tangled Leonardos around is a bit tricky to figure which one had what, when.

  • Here is a link to the Florida merger document:
    The dates make it reasonably obvious what was going on. Rossi and Annesser were preparing for the lawsuit (before the "ERV" report had been issued), and this was a detail to clean up. The document explicitly shows urgency.
    Was IH notified of the merger? If not, then they were sued by a "strange corporation" with whom they had no agreement, and their legal reaction (challenging standing) is then at least understandable.


    It is possible that the New Hampshire Leonardo was dissolved before the merger, which is why the merger was made retroactive, but I would have to locate that document.

    More information about Leonardo Florida:
    Incorporated 11/8/2010. Original President, Director, and Registered Agent: Rossi. Original Secretary and Director: James R. Travis of New Hampshire. This was personally filed by Rossi.
    Apr 22, 2013 new registered agent Henry Johnson.
    Jul 10, 2013 Travis no longer listed, but signed as "Accountant." This would be the Travis whose subpoena was quashed, Doc. 42.
    Mar 03, 2014 Rossi CEO, Johnson President

    So .... Johnson was established as President of Leonardo Florida before the Terms Sheet agreement with IH. However, at that point, the IH Agreement was with Leonardo New Hampshire, the merger did not take place until a few days before Rossi v. Darden was filed. Was IH aware of Leonardo Florida? Maybe. Maybe not. The Accountant for Leonardo Florida was from New Hampshire. Let's see what we find there.
    Status: Good Standing. Registered Agent: James R Travis.
    1997 formed Andrea Rossi sole incorporator
    1998 attorney assigned as registered agent.
    2005 James R. Travis registered agent.
    2008 Travis listed as officer.
    2014, 2015, no annual report.
    8/28/2015 Admin Dissolution/Suspension
    3/18/2016 Reinstatement Filed

    The reinstatement document was signed by Rossi, dated 3/3/2016. There was a reinstatement fee of $135, plus the two missing annual reports were filed, with a fee of $150 each, including the late fee, and then the 2016 report was filed, normal fee of $100.

    So.... I see all this as preparation for the suit. The Agreement provided that payment be made to Leonardo, which was the New Hampshire corporation. We have not seen the demand letter Rossi wrote, presumably March 29. We do not know if or when IH was notified of the merger.

  • March 21, 2016, when the merger was carried out, is after the end of the purported GPT. I think this was done in a rush in response to something, but I don't recall what. How far back in time would the merger need to be to deal with IH's challenge of standing, and would January 1, 2015, be sufficient? I know that IH and Rossi started dealing in business several years before that. If the merger was initiated as late as 2016, will there be a basis for overruling the retroactive part? Could IH argue that it had a relevant interest in whether there was a merger or an assignment (or no assignment), apart from the question of standing for the lawsuit?

    There is no problem with standing if IH New Hampshire was merged into IH Florida prior to filing the suit, and it was. A few days before!

    Annesser is correct that a merger was involved, not an assignment. However, if IH was also preparing for suit, at the time of preparation, there were two distinct corporations, so an assignment could have been assumed. That was an error. Attorneys make mistakes.

    If there was lack of notice to IH, this would be a nuisance problem. It could excuse the IH error. In some cases, errors can result in sanctions, one of the cases I read, studying Annesser's motion to strike, an attorney certified that there had been a pre-filing conference with the opposing party's counsel, when, in fact, he had been confused with another client, there had been no conference. He was fined for the trouble caused, (over $300, as I recall,) but then it became moot.

    What I see here is one more example of Rossi sloppiness. If Rossi consulted counsel about the Agreement (over $100 million involved!), he has conveniently forgotten what they told him. The whole thing about "they deceived me" was contrary to what any attorney would have told him.

  • So does the merger backdating to 2015 prevent legal problems with patents and applications held by the FL Leonardo entity that were included in the 2012 deal with IH and the NH Leonardo?

    There is a possible technical issue there; and IH points out that the two entities existed at the same time. Rossi's actions and inactions created a mess. My sense is that the merger adequately addressed that, though there may still be a problem, as I mentioned, with notice to IH. We do not know when IH realized that the New Hampshire corporation had been shut down for nonfiling of reports.

    However, this is a trivial issue compared to many others. It is like the tax issue. If Rossi has now filed and paid all the taxes, and has no tax liens or reasonably possible tax liens, there is no present violation or harm to IH. But there was a contract violation then, if there were unpaid taxes. This reminds me to look at the first Rossi motion to dismiss counterclaims. Document 41. (This is now moot and has been dismissed as such.)

    This is what I had remembered:


    Even if Plaintiffs had not paid all appropriate taxes, they have, there is absolutely no legal basis for Defendants baseless and conclusory allegation that there is a “likelihood” that the E-Cat IP will be the subject of a tax lien.

    I read that as more or less an admission that there had been some tax delinquency. I look at it now and see a different way to read it. I still notice that they did not claim that the taxes were paid on time. Given all the other sloppiness that we have seen, a tax delinquency would not be surprising.

    This happens all the time and is not normally any big issue. However, there is a contractual requirement, and, on the face of it, if there was a delinquency, there was a violation of the contract. IH is now explicitly not claiming current damages, reserving the right to claim such in the future under the contingency of a problem.

    Rossi wants this dismissed because he does not want the issue of old tax problems to be introduced. He could probably avoid that by stipulating the problem. I.e., that there was a delinquency, and that it was remedied. Otherwise if he denies what IH has as "information and belief," this could go to the jury, which is exactly what he does not want, and for obvious reasons. Annesser complains about IH motives here, but this is likely to be seen by the judge as whining. If Rossi was delinquent, he set up this problem.

    If not, then he needs to create clarity on that. A stipulation or statement under oath, under penalty of perjury, could nail this. A statement by an accountant would help. Both of these, if fraudulent, could be serious offenses, but if true, not a problem.

    As matters stand, I don't see how the judge can strike the claim. The claim is specific, and can be addressed by establishing the fact. The source of the "information and belief" may not be admissible as evidence, but IH would have the opportunity to establish the issue, and the matter being in the complaint will allow discovery, i.e., mandatory statement under oath.

  • Docket item 55:


    PAPERLESS NOTICE of Hearing on 54 MOTION to Strike 50 Answer to Complaint, Third Party Complaint, Counterclaim, in Part Second Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaims, and Third Party Claims, or in the Alternative, MOTION for More Definite Statement: Motion Hearing set for 10/14/2016 08:30 AM in Miami Division before Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga.

    (This item is not downloadable except as a docket download, which I don't normally do. So I don't see these until Pacermonitor has them.)

  • From the Second Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses


    4. Plaintiffs’ equitable claims are barred, in whole or in part, by reason of Plaintiffs’ unclean hands. Plaintiffs engaged in a scheme to deceive Defendants by, inter alia, improperly manipulating the Validation and Guaranteed Performance testing processes, fraudulently inducing Industrial Heat to enter the Term Sheet, and engaging in the other conduct alleged in support of the fraudulent inducement and FDUTPA claims pled infra. See Counterclaims and Third-Party Claims ¶¶ 1-11, 50-57, 69-92, 134-148 infra & Answer ¶¶ 57, 64, 71 supra

    Annesser alleges lack of the specificity required for this defense. Rather than spend a lot of time compiling specifics, I'm punting at this point. I am familiar with the IH Answer, in general. There are many specific allegations with time and place and the other elements Annesser claims are missing. Because the basis for the defense is clear in round outlines, the judge will not allow this claim to be struck; the most she would do is to require more detail.

    Based on her prior response to the Darden Motion to Dismiss, she is likely to simply allow any unclarity be resolved in discovery, instead of further complicating the pleadings.