Yes the placement of the EDG was the mostest stupidest mistake imaginable and the direct cause of the problems at Fukushima.
Cold Fusion News from Japan.
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Yes the placement of the EDG was the mostest stupidest mistake imaginable and the direct cause of the problems at Fukushima.
As we know from direct witness and a live broadcast from JSTV international the Daichi 1 vessel did break during the stroke. Also the cooling pipe for passive cooling did disconnect. Blaming the power loss is a cheap excuse used to downplay the risks for the remaining nukes.
I was luckily looking the broadcast where one could see personal running around with lead sleeves they did put on the reactor top to reduce the building (control room) radiation.
The other witness were 4 German engineers that have been on site during the event...
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Well Mr. Wyttenbach on one hand you are entitled to your own opinion but if you bothered to read the peer reviewed publication (https://news.usc.edu/86362/fuk…ventable-new-study-finds/) also quoted by RB, you would see the blame was clearly placed on the placement of the EDG. Had they not lost their cooling, not of the issues you raised would have been a major problem.
Perhaps try to read the paper.
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I don't know why the engineers ignored these warnings from the epoch of the shoguns.
I expect they did not know about them.
Yes the placement of the EDG was the mostest stupidest mistake imaginable and the direct cause of the problems at Fukushima.
(EDG = emergency diesel generator). Yes, 31 out of 33 EDGs were destroyed (https://news.usc.edu/86362/fuk…ventable-new-study-finds/). So were most fuel tanks. If more EDGs and tanks had survived, the hydrogen explosions could probably have been prevented. As I recall, there may have been damage, but not as bad.
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you would see the blame was clearly placed on the placement of the EDG.
Of course the placement was a big mistake. But it had zero influence on the outcome as we did know a few week later, where people understood that the vessel is damaged.
Only difference with power would have been:: The instruments would have told them that there was almost no water in the vessel....
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So were most fuel tanks. If more EDGs and tanks had survived, the hydrogen explosions could probably have been prevented. As I recall, there may have been damage, but not as bad.
One of my friends - who worked on reactor cooling for Mitsubishi Heavy Industries tried to get them to unbolt and remove some of the corrugated roof panels above the tanks emitting hydrogen - the objective being to let the hydrogen escape so avoiding an explosion. This was a few days before the explosion occurred. But this and other attempted interventions by MHI engineers who put a team together to work at the site were rebuffed.
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One of my friends - who worked on reactor cooling for Mitsubishi Heavy Industries tried to get them to unbolt and remove some of the corrugated roof panels above the tanks emitting hydrogen - the objective being to let the hydrogen escape so avoiding an explosion. This was a few days before the explosion occurred. But this and other attempted interventions by MHI engineers who put a team together to work at the site were rebuffed.
CANDU used to make and sell special catalytic vent panels specifically for this problem.
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yes from someone who has experienced H2 explosions in my own lab, more thought should be put into this type of thinking! I think there are quite a few methods such as platinum screens that one could use to convert hydrogen to water vapor in a controlled way to avoid explosive atmospheres. These should be mandatory in all similar reactors.
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CANDU used to make and sell special catalytic vent panels specifically for this problem.
yes from someone who has experienced H2 explosions in my own lab, more thought should be put into this type of thinking! I think there are quite a few methods such as platinum screens that one could use to convert hydrogen to water vapor in a controlled way to avoid explosive atmospheres.
I recall that the problem was that hydrogen rose to the top of the building, and there was not much oxygen up there. It was not stoichiometric. So even with a recombiner up at the top, it would not all recombine. And of course if you started up a reaction anywhere that got too hot . . . Kaboom! I think hydrogen had to be vented out the top of the containment buildings, and they could not do that fast enough.
A recombiner inside the reactor in a place where all of hydrogen and oxygen passes through would work.
During the Three Mile Island accident they worried about a hydrogen explosion. It did not happen, and I recall after a while they determined it was unlikely, but it was a concern. QUOTE:
The hydrogen bubble
When the reactor's core was uncovered, on the morning of 28 March, a high-temperature chemical reaction between water and the zircaloy metal tubes holding the nuclear fuel pellets had created hydrogen gas. In the afternoon of 28 March, a sudden rise in reactor building pressure shown by the control room instruments indicated a hydrogen burn had occurred. Hydrogen gas also gathered at the top of the reactor vessel.
From 30 March through 1 April operators removed this hydrogen gas "bubble" by periodically opening the vent valve on the reactor cooling system pressuriser. For a time, regulatory (NRC) officials believed the hydrogen bubble could explode, though such an explosion was never possible since there was not enough oxygen in the system.
Three Mile Island | TMI 2 |Three Mile Island Accident. - World Nuclear Association
I don't see how that could be. The hydrogen came from water, so where was the oxygen in this closed system? I don't get it. (Note: The hydrogen and oxygen are separated by the high temperature of the exposed reactor core.)
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The top events are the 3 we well know, however it existed so many "less important hydrogen problems" during the nuclear history.
Even in France a metallurgist i knew involved a while in Lenr, was payed to check so many problematic zirconium tubes not as tame as expected..
Display MoreI recall that the problem was that hydrogen rose to the top of the building, and there was not much oxygen up there. It was not stoichiometric. So even with a recombiner up at the top, it would not all recombine. And of course if you started up a reaction anywhere that got too hot . . . Kaboom! I think hydrogen had to be vented out the top of the containment buildings, and they could not do that fast enough.
A recombiner inside the reactor in a place where all of hydrogen and oxygen passes through would work.
During the Three Mile Island accident they worried about a hydrogen explosion. It did not happen, and I recall after a while they determined it was unlikely, but it was a concern. QUOTE:
The hydrogen bubble
When the reactor's core was uncovered, on the morning of 28 March, a high-temperature chemical reaction between water and the zircaloy metal tubes holding the nuclear fuel pellets had created hydrogen gas. In the afternoon of 28 March, a sudden rise in reactor building pressure shown by the control room instruments indicated a hydrogen burn had occurred. Hydrogen gas also gathered at the top of the reactor vessel.
From 30 March through 1 April operators removed this hydrogen gas "bubble" by periodically opening the vent valve on the reactor cooling system pressuriser. For a time, regulatory (NRC) officials believed the hydrogen bubble could explode, though such an explosion was never possible since there was not enough oxygen in the system.
https://world-nuclear.org/info…mile-island-accident.aspx
I don't see how that could be. The hydrogen came from water, so where was the oxygen in this closed system? I don't get it. (Note: The hydrogen and oxygen are separated by the high temperature of the exposed reactor core.)
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I think hydrogen had to be vented out the top of the containment buildings, and they could not do that fast enough.
They could have done it very quickly and easily. The roof panels were corrugated fibrous cement held on with bolts.
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I recall that the problem was that hydrogen rose to the top of the building, and there was not much oxygen up there. It was not stoichiometric.
That can't be right. I was mixed up. Anyway, I do recall the hydrogen was trapped in the top of the building. They could not get it out in time. I don't suppose someone could have gone up there to break holes in the roof. It was dangerous with all that radiation.
It was a spectacular explosion. Here is an interesting video about it.
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I don't suppose someone could have gone up there to break holes in the roof.
There is an emergency vent built into all reactor building roofs. Tepco simply did not use it in regular trainings. They tried to open it! People went on the roof but as said corrosion did block it...
