j9381 Verified User
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Posts by j9381

    Does anyone have access to a Direct Current type SQUID device (Superconducting Quantum Interference Device) and can do a few experiments for a friend. He needs a SQUID system (data acquisition, passive and active magnetic shielding, offset control etc.) with high sensitivity. I would assume a sensitivity of something like 150 femtoTesla or higher if we can't find something that sensitive. I assume my friend can pay $6,000 or more for a series of experiments.

    I tried to replicate Mizuno's work 3 years ago but failed to get positive results. I used static air cooled calorimetery where I calibrated the vessel with heat pulses from a resistor and then compared that to nickel mesh/deuterium with palladium rubbed on the mesh according to the protocol. I won't say it was a perfect replication but I tried. I didn't have the funding or time to try lots of iterations. The measurement accuracy was better than +/- 10 percent I would guess (well, maybe better than +/- 15% since I really should have done more calibrating after I changed things slightly).

    I am looking for people who would like to team up and do a simplified replication of the Safire Project experiment. The Safire group see transmutations to other elements in the tungsten electrode and excess heat with an experiment using high-voltage electrodes in a hydrogen (plus more gasses) atmosphere.


    Here is a report written by the Safire group (transmutation results listed on page 53) from 2017:

    https://www.safireproject.com/science/ewExternalFiles/SAFIRE-Project-Report.pdf


    One option for my experiment is to design and build a 12 to 20 inch long quartz tube with tungsten electrodes at each end. It will use Kovar steel and Pyrex (borosilicate) glass for the hermetic seal at each end which allows for the high voltage feedthroughs and the gas feedthrough. In this design, Kovar steel is fused with Pyrex glass and the Pyrex glass is fused with the quartz. Kovar steel has about the same thermal expansion coefficient as Pyrex glass which creates a glass / metal joint with low stresses as the temperature changes. Various cathode and anode materials could be tried including tungsten and nickel steels. Gases will include hydrogen, nitrogen, argon and small amounts of water vapor and various combinations with more gasses.


    Ideally I would find an investor. Can anyone help out with machining? Or welding of steel tube and swagelok vacuum fittings? Saving money on those tasks will allow me to put more money into other parts of the experiment. Does anyone want to build the same experiment? If so that would allow for splitting machining costs due to lower costs per part when ordering multiple parts.


    Off-the-shelf conflat seal to borosilicate adapters:

    Ideal Vacuum | Conflat Fittings And Flanges, Adapters, Adapter, Conflat to Glass Borosilicate


    Technique of joining Kovar steel to borosilicate glass:

    Making Connections to Glass-to Metal Seals | Larson Electronic Glass, LLC


    The Safire group are now known as Aureon:

    Science | Aureon Energy, Ltd.

    Yes I think it probably makes sense to do a bake out at maximum operating temperature and then reapply the vacuum. I’m not sure how much vacuum we can apply before the titanium box starts to collapse with the ceramic wool inside. They is why I was considering just about 50mbar maximum vacuum so any possible outgassing should result in a minimal increase in heat transfer, but the overall thermal conductivity will be higher but the variation will be minimal. We will have to see but as I want to remove any source of variability more than achieve the best possible vacuum. I agree as we move forward and we start to aim for infinite COP operation then minimizing thermal conductivity will be a higher priority.

    This is not a solution because it will just outgass again - you have to bake the panel *after* the final application of the vacuum.


    In other words, the bake out is the last step in manufacturing the panels, not applying vacuum.

    Paper comparing panels made of various materials.

    I had to download the paper to see the tables correctly formatted - otherwise it can be confusing especially table 7 which made little sense otherwise.


    https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/secm-2013-0162/pdf



    In table 7, the thermal conductivity of the panels at atmospheric pressure is 3 to 5 times the thermal conductivity at 1 mbar (i.e. 1/1000 of an atmosphere).


    The question is: What is the thermal conductivity change after the core insulation outgases? I think there is risk it could be as much as 5% or 10%.


    You say that you will verify the calibration constant using a dummy cell before and after the active cell to confirm that the calibration has not changed. Prior to any calibration run, you may want to bake the fully finished vacuum panels at some high temperature so as to get the outgassing and whatever else out of the way so that your calibration constant changes the least during experimentation. You could even run the calibration before and after this bakeout to see any changes.

    As Alan says outgassing isn’t an issue. We are just reducing the gas pressure inside the VIP to reduce kinetic energy transfer between the walls. There are more exotic materials available such as aerogel insulation but that’s overkill in this application.

    the surface area of ceramic fiber insulation with plastic binders is enormous and will outgas (any ceramic fiber insulation having stiffness has some plastic binders), the fact that you say it's a double wall means these gases are not exposed to your active material (nickel?).


    It may not be worth the aggravation to put a vacuum in those titanium panels - because of outgassing and risks that the panel insulation coefficient will change - this is just a gut feeling.


    It's important to make sure the calibration experiment matches the active experiment as much as possible. I had a situation where I used more nickel mesh in the active experiment compared to the calibration experiment. It was probably twice or three times the amount of nickel mesh in the active experiment compared to stainless steel mesh in the calibration experiment - plus the mesh opening size was smaller in the active experiment compared to the calibration. As result, the average temperature was something around 10 C colder for the active experiment compared to the calibration experiment at the same power level (and thus this was a failed reproduction). I attribute the colder temperature to the amount and size of the mesh being different between the active and calibration experiment (and no excess heat) which redirected the heat flow to other parts of the calorimeter and away from the thermocouples, there were 10 thermocouples on the outside of the vessel.


    I assume you will base your excess heat on the thermocouples in the hottest areas right next to the active vessel (i.e. the center of the insulated box). I would say small amounts of excess heat could be due to differences between active and control experiments. But if you get a big result, then it is more likely real. My initial assumption is the insulation you use around the vessel will minimize any problem with the control being different than the active. I did not have insulation around my vessel.

    It’s quite simple actually. It’s simple a titanium double walled box filled with ceramic insulation to prevent the walls from collapsing and then removing the air with a vacuum pump to further reduce heat flow.

    the ceramic insulation will have a large outgassing. Is the gasses from the ceramic insulation exposed to the active metal (nickel or whatever you have)?

    more details below, this was a very interesting article on Goodyear:


    Charles Goodyear: The Father of Vulcanization
    Charles Goodyear would spend the best years of his life experimenting with ways to make rubber a useful material. His endeavors would see him ruin his and his…
    interestingengineering.com


    Charles Goodyear: The Father of Vulcanization

    Charles Goodyear ignored all his critics and developed the groundbreaking technique of vulcanization at great personal cost.

    Christopher McFadden

    Created: Dec 17, 2017 12:40 PM EST

    CULTURE

    Charles GoodyearMattes/Wikimedia Commons

    Charles Goodyear was an American inventor, self-taught chemist and manufacturing engineer who discovered the vulcanization process for rubber. The well-known company Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company were named in his honor after his death.

    Charles was born on the 29th December 1800 in New Haven, Connecticut. His groundbreaking work on rubber would begin with his experimentation in 1834. 5 years later he would accidentally discover the process known as vulcanization.

    SEE ALSO

    Despite the significance of his discovery, Goodyear would struggle to patent vulcanized rubber until 1844. He would die penniless on the 19th July 1860 in New York City. The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company were founded in his name in 1898.

    Engraving of Charles Goodyear. Source: Howcheng/Wikimedia Commons

    Early Years

    Charles Goodyear was born in New Haven, Connecticut. He was the son of Amasa and Cynthia Bateman Goodyear and the eldest of six children. His father was actually a descendant of Stephen Goodyear. Stephen, from London, England, was supposed to be one of the founders of the New Haven Colony in 1638.

    Charles would leave home in 1814 to travel to Philadelphia to learn the hardware business. Here he would work very hard until he was 21 when he returned Connecticut. On his return, Charles entered into a partnership with his father's business in Naugatuck.

    The father and son team would then begin manufacturing ivory and metal buttons as well as other agricultural implements.

    In August of 1824, Charles would marry Clarissa Beecher. A few years later the young family once again moved to Philadelphia. Here Charles opened his first hardware store. It was here that the majority of his early career was to be spent.

    Source: Goodyear

    At this point in his life, Charles specialized in the manufacture of agricultural implements. At this point in time, there had been a distrust of domestically made farming implements. Most consumers preferred to import goods from the British Empire. This district was beginning to wane and Charles would find he was soon running a rather successful business.

    His success grew and grew until his health would fail him in 1829. Charles was struck down with dyspepsia. This was not to be the end of his woes, however. A failure of a number of business endeavors also seriously harmed his firm. His company struggled on but were eventually required to enter bankruptcy.

    Soon after in around 1831 and 1832, Charles Goodyear would hear about gum elastic. He became obsessed with the material, reading every article that appeared in newspapers on it.

    Rubber the wonder material

    A U.S. firm, the Roxbury India Rubber Company based in Boston had also begun to experiments with this new material. They believed they had found ways of manufacturing goods from it.

    Some of these early Roxbury goods caught Goodyear's attention. Soon after, Goodyear would visit New York and find himself introduced to life preservers. It struck him, immediately, that the tube used for inflation was not very effective or well made.

    When he returned home to Philadelphia he began making tubes with his own design valves. He would once again return to New York and walk into a retail store of the Roxbury India Rubber Company.

    Charles Goodyear showed the store manager his brand new valve but the store manager shook his head. Although impressed with the design, he informed Charles that the company was not in the market for valves at that moment in time. In fact, they would be lucky to stay in business at all in the not so distant future.

    The Goodyear company was named after Charles Goodyear. Source: CapturedGlimpsesPhoto/Wikimedia Commons

    The manager showed Goodyear exactly why. They had racks upon racks of rubber goods that had begun to melt in hot weather. Thousands of dollars of other goods were being returned in large quantities as well. Most were beginning to rot, thereby making them completely useless.

    The Company's Directors had even met in the dead of night to bury £20,000 worth of spoilt rejects into a pit.

    The rubber fever

    In the early 1830s a 'rubber fever' had gripped the United States and abated almost as soon as it had begun. At first, consumers were enamored with the new wonder material from Brazil. The gum could be seemingly be shaped and molded into almost anything and it was waterproof.

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    Factories had begun to spring up everywhere to cash in on the new craze. But the products being churned out turned out to be less than the highest quality. The public became angry with the gums tendency to freeze bone-hard in winter and turn into glue in the summer.

    Rubber taping. Source: Manojk/Wikimedia Commons

    Not a single one of the start-up rubber factories would survive for longer than 5 years. Investors would lose millions of dollars. Everyone seemed to agree that rubber was done for in America.

    Charles was disappointed and pocketed his small valve. He also took a look at the rubber products in question. He had toyed with small pieces as a child, but now the strange material took on a new affinity in his mind.

    Charles Goodyear, however, made his mind up to experiment with this gum to see if he could cure these problems. “There is probably no other inert substance,” he would later say, “which so excites the mind.”

    Goodyear promptly packed up his things and returned, once again, home to Philadelphia. Unfortunately, not to a welcome reception.

    Go to jail, do not pass go

    A former creditor had him arrested and imprisoned. This was not to be his last visit to jail as it turned out. Whilst there Goodyear asked his wife to bring him batches of raw rubber and her rolling pin to experiment. And so, it was there in his jail cell that Goodyear would begin his groundbreaking work on rubber.

    At that point, the gum was relatively inexpensive and he would spend his time heating and working it with his hands. Goodyear reasoned that if the rubber was a natural adhesive couldn't he add some dry powder to make it less sticky?

    He further postulated wither he should add a talc-like substance like magnesia powder. Charles managed to incorporate a certain amount of this powder to produce a beautiful white compound that appeared to, indeed, be less sticky than normal.

    Charles thought he was on to a winner. He even managed to secure some investment from childhood friends in New Haven. Goodyear and his family began to make up hundreds of pairs of magnesia-dried rubber overshoes in their kitchen.

    Before they could take them to market, however, the footwear began to sag into a shapeless paste in the summer.

    A combination of his neighbors complaining and investors discouragement, Goodyear decided to move his experiments elsewhere. Charles would sell his family's furniture, place them in a quiet boarding place, and move to New York.

    Once there a friend gave him the fourth-floor tenement bedroom in the attic to become his laboratory. In time his brother-in-law would visit and lecture him on his hungry children. He also reminded Goodyear that rubber was dead.

    “I am the man to bring it back,” Goodyear would retort defiantly.

    Charles Goodyear begins his experiments

    In his makeshift lab, Goodyear decided to compound the rubber with quicklime and boil it in a mixture of quicklime and water. This technique had startling results and appeared to solve the problem.

    His success was quickly noticed and he received international acclaim. A New York trade show even awarded him a medal for his solution to making India Rubber lose its stickiness.

    Charles Goodyear was understandably pleased until that was, he noticed a new problem. He observed that a weak drop of acid was enough to neutralize the alkali and cause the rubber to become soft again. Disheartened Goodyear continued his experiments.

    On one occasion he applied some nitric acid to one sample of rubber. This had a strange effect on the rubber making it smooth and as dry as a cloth. This surface cure was considerably better than anyone had ever made before.

    Throughout this time, Charles was experimenting heavily with nitric acid and lead oxide. Exposure to these kinds of chemicals was starting to adversely affect his health. He almost suffocated from the vapors produced in his laboratory. Thankfully he survived but the episode resulted in a fever that also almost claimed his life.

    Charles's new success attracted the attention of a New York businessman. Goodyear was advanced several thousand dollars to begin production.

    Boom and bust

    The company started to make clothes, life preservers, rubber shoes and other rubber goods. They also had a large factory with special machinery, built at Staten Island, where he moved his family and again had a home of his own.

    Sadly, the financial panic in 1837 wiped out his backer and the embryonic business and left Charles and his backer penniless.

    Charles's next move was to travel to Boston. Here he became acquainted with J. Haskins of the Roxbury Rubber Company. They would become very close friends over time. Haskins would lend Goodyear some money and offer help and support for the inventor.

    He also became acquainted with one Mr. Chaffer. He was also very kind to Goodyear and ready to listen to his plans and offer assistance. Mr. Chaffer noted that much of Goodyear's issues with rubber could be the solvent he was using. He invented a machine to help mix the rubber through mechanical rather than chemical means.

    Rubbertapper on a plantation. Source: M.casanova /Wikimedia Commons

    The goods that were made in this way were beautiful to look at, and it appeared, as it had before, that all difficulties were overcome.

    Goodyear also, around this time, developed a new technique for making rubber shoes. He even received a patent which he sold to the Providence Company on Rhode Island. But, as before, a method to process rubber so it could withstand hot and cold temperatures and acids was still yet to be discovered.

    So any rubber goods produced were constantly growing sticky, decomposing and being returned to the manufacturers.

    Vulcanisation

    Vulcanisation is a chemical process whereby the physical properties of natural or synthetic rubber are improved. Vulcanised rubber has much higher tensile strength than untreated rubber and has great resistance to swelling, abrasion and is elastic over a great range of temperatures.

    The most basic method of accomplishing vulcanization is to use a mixture of sulfur and heat on rubber. The process was discovered in 1839 by Charles Goodyear after many years of trial and error.

    His experiments also noted important functions of certain additional substances in the process. One such material, called an accelerator, can cause vulcanization to proceed much more rapidly at lower temperatures.

    Source: Wheels/Wikimedia Commons

    Reactions between rubber and sulfur are not fully understood but within the final product. Sulfur is not dissolved or dispersed in the rubber, rather it appears to become chemically combined. This appears to occur mainly in the form of cross-links, or bridges, between the long-chain molecules of the rubber.

    Modern practices of vulcanization occur between temperatures of 130 to 180 degrees Celcius. Sulfur and accelerators are also added. Modern rubber also usually has carbon black or zinc oxide added. These two materials don't just act as extenders, but also improve the quality of the final rubber.

    Anti-oxidants are also commonly included to retard deterioration caused by oxygen and ozone.

    Certain synthetic rubbers are not vulcanized by sulfur but give satisfactory products upon similar treatment with metal oxides or organic peroxides.

    His great discovery

    Several years earlier, Charles Goodyear has started a small factory in Springfield, Massachusetts. He moved his primary operations there in 1842. This factory was run mainly by Charles' brothers Nelson and Henry.

    At last, Charles found that steam under pressure, applied for four to six hours at around 132 degrees Celsius, gave him the most uniform results.

    Charles' brother-in-law, was a wealthy wool manufacturer who also became involved in Goodyear's business. His brother-in-law became interested after Charles had told him that interwoven rubber threads would produce the fashionable puckered effect that was popular in men's shirts.

    Source: Bill Ebbesen/Wikimedia Commons

    Two “shirred goods” factories were thus rushed into production. This would help rubber become a worldwide success.

    Charles Goodyear continued to make the process practical. I 1844, in Springfield, the process was sufficiently perfected enough for him to take out a patent.

    The first vulcanization of rubber is considered one of the major "firsts" that contributes to the City of Springfield's nickname, "The City of Firsts."

    In 1844, Goodyear's brother Henry introduced mechanical mixing of the mixture in place of the use of solvents.

    Patent lawsuits

    Goodyear sent several samples of his heat and sulfur treated gum to British rubber companies in an attempt to drum up overseas business. These samples were sent without any further details. One sample found its way into the possession of a famed English rubber pioneer, Thomas Hancock.

    Thomas had been slaving away trying to make rubber waterproof for over 20 years. On close examination, Hancock noticed a yellow sulfur 'bloom' on Goodyear's sample. Using this clue Hancock reverse engineered the process and 'reinvented' vulcanization in 1843.

    Goodyear attempted to file his British patent soon after only to find Hancock had beat him to it. A lawsuit would soon follow.

    If Goodyear was to win the suit he stood to have his own patent accepted and be granted royalties from Hancock's products. There was also another rival in the UK. Stephen Moulton who had also filed his own patent for the process.

    Both men had examined Goodyear's samples in 1842.

    Vulcanising process at the dental corps laboratory, France. Source: Fæ /Wikimedia Commons

    Hancock offered Goodyear a half-share in his own patent in an attempt to drop the suit. Goodyear, smelling blood, declined. In fact, the very term vulcanization had been coined by one of Hancocks associates from Vulcan, the Roman god of fire.

    During the subsequent lawsuits, chemists testified that the process could not have been divined from just studying it. Goodyear lost his lawsuits.

    Despite this, Charles Goodyear would remain upbeat later writing:

    “In reflecting upon the past, as relates to these branches of industry, the writer is not disposed to repine and say that he has planted, and others have gathered the fruits. The advantages of a career in life should not be estimated exclusively by the standard of dollars and cents, as is too often done. Man has just cause for regret when he sows and no one reaps.”

    Later life and death

    Charles Goodyear died on July the 1st 1860. Sadly he died en route to see his dying daughter. When he finally arrived in New York he was informed of her death and subsequently collapsed himself.

    When he died in 1860, Charles was around $200,000 in debt. Thankfully for his family, accumulated royalties eventually made them comfortable. His son, Charles Junior, inherited Charles' inventive talent and would go on to build a small fortune made from shoemaking machinery. The Goodyear welt, a technique in shoemaking, was also named after his son.

    Charles was rushed to Fifth Avenue Hotel, New York where he died at the age of 59. Charles Goodyear was then buried in Grove Street Cemetery, New Haven.

    Charles Goodyear' grave in New Haven. Source: KLOTZ/Wikimedia Commons

    Most notably for us today, almost four decades after his death, the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company was founded. It was named in his honor by its founder, Frank Seiberling. Apart from his namesake neither Charles himself or his family have any connection with this multi-billion dollar company.

    Goodyear is one of the world's largest rubber businesses in the world. Goodyear’s only direct descendant of modern companies is United States Rubber, which years ago absorbed a small company he once served as director.

    Goodyear' legacy

    The French Government made Charles a Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur in 1855.

    Charles Goodyear was inducted into the National Inventors Hall of Fame in February of 1976. In Woburn, Massachusetts there is even an elementary school named in his honor.

    There is a Charles Goodyear Medal that is awarded by the ACS Rubber Division. This medal honors inventors, innovators, and developers whose contributions resulted in a significant change to the nature of the rubber industry.

    It is interesting to think that today there are is a cultivated rubber tree for every two human beings on earth. Millions of tree 'milkers' harvest the crop. The United States, alone, imports almost half of this and synthesizes as much or more from petroleum.

    Crosslinking of polyisoprene by vulcanization. Source: Hbf878/Wikimedia Commons

    Hundreds of thousands of Americans livelihoods are based on rubber manufacture and it is a multi-billion dollar industry worldwide. All of these people have one hardy and tenacious little inventor from almost two centuries ago.

    “Life,” Charles Goodyear wrote, “should not be estimated exclusively by the standard of dollars and cents. I am not disposed to complain that I have planted and others have gathered the fruits. A man has cause for regret only when he sows and no one reaps.”

    this was interesting, Charles Goodyear, inventor of vulcanized rubber, they put him in debtors prison for awhile!, (pasted it from facebook)

    Charles Goodyear left school at age 12 to work in his father’s hardware store in Connecticut. At age 23 he married Clarissa Beecher and soon afterwards the couple moved to Philadelphia, where Goodyear opened a hardware store of his own.

    Goodyear was a competent merchant, but his passions were chemistry, materials science, and invention. In the late 1820s he became particularly fascinated with finding and improving practical applications for natural rubber (called India rubber). His experimentation would change the world, but Goodyear’s path to success would be challenging.

    In 1830, at age 29, Goodyear was suffering from health issues and his rubber experiments (which he had funded by borrowing) had not been successful. By the end of the year his business was bankrupt and he was thrown into debtor’s prison. In was an inauspicious beginning to his career as a scientist and inventor.

    The principal troubles with finding commercial applications for natural rubber was that the material was inelastic and was not durable, decomposing and becoming sticky depending on temperature. Goodyear was determined to find a chemical solution to overcome those issues, beginning his experiments while in jail. After numerous failures, his breakthrough came when he tried heating the rubber together with sulfur and other additives. In 1843 he wrote a friend, “I have invented a new process of hardening India rubber by means of sulphur and it is as much superior to the old method as the malleable iron is superior to cast iron. I have called it Vulcanization.”

    Goodyear filed his patent application for vulcanized rubber on February 24, 1844 (one hundred seventy-nine years ago today) and the patent was issued four months later. It is thanks to vulcanization that rubber can be used to make tires, shoe soles, hoses, and countless other items. It was one of the most profoundly important technological achievements of the 19th century.

    So, Charles Goodyear became wealthy as a result? Unfortunately, no. He continued to struggle financially for the rest of his life, embroiled in litigation with other inventors over the validity of his patent, preventing him from profiting from it. Meanwhile, his wife Clarissa contracted tuberculosis and much of the family’s income was devoted to her medical expenses and extensive travel in search of a cure. Clarissa died in 1848 at age 39, leaving six children, between the ages of 4 and 17.

    At age 54, while still struggling to defend his patents and commercialize his invention, Goodyear married 40-year-old Mary Starr (who had not previously been married) and the couple would go on to have two children together. It too was a happy marriage, but Goodyear was not destined to long enjoy it.

    Suffering the adverse effects of years of exposure to dangerous chemicals, Goodyear collapsed at a hotel in New York City on July 1, 1860, dying later that day. At the time of his death, he was 59 years old, penniless, and deeply in debt.

    The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, founded in Akron, Ohio by Frank Seiberling nearly 40 years later, was named in honor of Charles Goodyear. Neither Charles Goodyear nor anyone in his family was connected with the company.

    Reflecting on Goodyear’s achievements, the historian Samuel Eliot Morrison wrote, “The story of Goodyear and his discovery of vulcanization is one of the most interesting and instructive in the history of science and industry.” But, as he added, “It is also an epic of human suffering and triumph, for Goodyear's life was one of almost continuous struggle against poverty and ill health.” Goodyear himself was philosophical about his failure to achieve financial success, writing that he was not disposed to complain that he had planted and others had gathered the fruit. “The advantages of a career in life should not be estimated exclusively by the standard of dollars and cents, as is too often done. Man has just cause for regret when he sows and no one reaps.”

    A Scam or a Sham.


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    that video on Dr. Burzynski was amazing - basically his cure for cancer is 10 times cheaper than chemotherapy/radiation/surgery so the FDA hounded him with multiple grand juries for 15 years without any conviction. He uses drugs and multiple metabolites/peptides to turn off cancer growth genes. And FDA limits any clinical trials on his breakthrough treatment and as a result there is little/no clinical trials to show its effectiveness. The obvious reason the FDA did all this was to protect the large amounts of money in standard cancer therapies (chemo/radiation/surgery). Even a foreign group in japan successfully using Dr. Burzynski's methods decided to stop because they were afraid the FDA would prevent their other drugs from being authorized in the USA. You can see that at minute 1:34:20 in the video below:

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    Dr. Burzynski still practices his breakthrough cancer treatment in Texas. Imagine if FDA helped him and more researchers worked on his technology? It could solve a lot of cancers.

    Burzynski Clinic | Advanced Integrative Cancer Treatment | Houston, Texas
    The Burzynski Clinic is a unique organization providing a wide variety of personalized cancer treatments.
    www.burzynskiclinic.com

    The real irony of the Browns Ferry fire was that two days before, a similar fire had started but had been put out successfully. After the fire on Thursday night, the shift engineers and three assistant shift engineers met. According to one of them,

    "We discussed among the group the procedure of using lighted candles to check for air leaks. Our conclusion was that the procedure should be stopped."

    Yet nothing was done. The fire was noted in the plant log, and briefly discussed the next day at the plant management meeting. No one on the management level seemed to consider it a safety problem worth following up. This was the standard operating procedure; as the NRC investigative report notes,

    "Previous fires in the polyurethane foam materials had not always been reported to the appropriate levels of management, and, on the occasions when reported, no action was taken to prevent recurrence."

    so basically, this nearly catastrophic meltdown of the reactor was fortuitous in that it has kept us safe since 1975 because we have not (I assume) had any big nuclear plant fires since (not that I have searched the internet for these). That being said, I have never supported nuclear power and this just makes my stance stronger. Technology is better now - but I still have no plans to change my mind. Look at the mistakes made at Fukushima - which had back up diesel generators for cooling in areas where they could get damaged / flooded.


    When the Fukushima Daiichi station was constructed, the emergency diesel generators and emergency batteries were installed on the floor inside the plant building to afford protection against earthquakes. Ventilation ducts in the compartments where this equipment was located were not waterproofed. Moving this emergency power equipment to higher ground, safety experts said, would not have increased its vulnerability to seismic shock, provided it was fixed to a platform designed to resist earthquakes.62

    The value of taking such action was demonstrated by upgrades that one Japanese utility, Japan Atomic Power Company (JAPC), was in the process of carrying out when the tsunami struck Japan’s east coast. JAPC’s Tokai-2 plant is located about 100 miles south of Fukushima, and the tsunami that ravaged Fukushima also caused flooding at Tokai-2. Prior to the tsunami, JAPC had partially implemented plans to erect a wall to prevent tsunami water from flooding two pits at the plant where seawater pumps were located and to make the pump rooms watertight. The wall was erected before the tsunami occurred. Water entered one of the pits because spaces where pipes penetrated into the pit had not yet been made watertight before the accident. In that pit, a seawater pump that provided cooling for an emergency diesel generator was damaged and unable to function, forcing JAPC to shut down the generator. But no flooding occurred at the other pit where pipe penetrations had been made watertight.63 This saved the cooling pumps for two more diesel generators. Had JAPC not carried out these upgrades, it would almost certainly have lost all three emergency diesel generators, potentially resulting in a much more serious accident.

    I believe so! That's what he has talked about in the past.


    Before Fukushima I was a lukewarm supporter of nuclear energy. I considered it the least bad solution. For now. Better than coal. That was despite the accidents at Three Mile Island, Connecticut Yankee, Davis-Besse, Brown's Ferry and other outrageous accidents. If the public knew about these accidents there would be less support for nuclear power. Did you know, the Browns Ferry accident in 1975 was caused by some guy with a lit candle looking for air leaks in a hallway? And it nearly destroyed all three redundant control systems because they all went down that same hallway? After you read that kind of detail, you will feel less confident in U.S. nuclear plant engineering. It sounds like it was designed and operated by the Three Stooges.

    I looked up the Brown's Ferry nuclear accident and found this link:

    The Fire at the Bown's Ferry Nuclear Power Station

    Absolutely fascinating - I highlighted in Bold where many people understand that the foam is flammable, there are multiple minor flammable accidents and still no one stops the use of using a candle to inspect for air leaks, almost unbelievable,

    I trimmed out some of the boring parts (about 1/2 of the article) from that link here is the interesting stuff - I put in Bold some of the more outrageous stuff:


    ======================================

    How a Candle Caused a Nuclear Emergency

    At noon on March 22, 1975, both Units 1 and 2 at the Brown's Ferry plant in Alabama were operating at full power, delivering 2200 megawatts of electricity to the Tennessee Valley Authority.

    Just below the plant's control room, two electricians were trying to seal air leaks in the cable spreading room, where the electrical cables that control the two reactors are separated and routed through different tunnels to the reactor buildings. They were using strips of spongy foam rubber to seal the leaks. They were also using candles to determine whether or not the leaks had been successfully plugged -- by observing how the flame was affected by escaping air.

    The electrical engineer put the candle too close to the foam rubber, and it burst into flame.

    The resulting fire, which disabled a large number of engineered safety systems at the plant, including the entire emergency core cooling system (ECCS) on Unit 1, and almost resulted in a boiloff/meltdown accident, demonstrates the vulnerability of nuclear plants to "single failure" events and human fallibility.

    How The Fire Got Started

    The fire was started by an electrical inspector (referred to in the NRC report as "C"), working with an electrician, "D", who said,

    "Because the wall is about 30 inches thick and the opening deep, I could not reach in far enough, so C [the inspector] asked me for the foam and he stuffed it into the hole. The foam is in sheet form, it is a 'plastic' about 2 inches thick, that we use as a backing material."

    The inspector, "C", describes what happened next:

    "We found a 2 x 4 inch opening in a penetration window in a tray with three or four cables going through it. The candle flame was pulled out horizontal showing a strong draft. D [the electrician] tore off two pieces of foam sheet for packing into the hole. I rechecked the hole with the candle. The draft sucked the flame into the hole and ignited the foam which started to smoulder and glow.

    "The material ignited by the candle flame was resilient polyurethane foam. Once the foam was ignited, the flame spread very rapidly. After the first application of the CO2 , the fire had spread through to the reactor building side of the penetration. Once ignited, the resilient polyurethane foam splattered as it burned. After the second extinguisher was applied, there was a roaring sound from the fire and a blowtorch effect due to the airflow through the penetration.

    "The airflow through the penetration pulled the material from discharging fire extinguishers through the penetration into the reactor building. Dry chemicals would extinguish the flames, but the flame would start back up."

    "I checked and found that the only water supply to the reactor at this time was the control rod drive pump, so I increased its output to maximum."

    Meanwhile, a few feet away on the Unit 2 side of the control room, warning lights had also been going off for some time. A shift engineer stated,

    "Panel lights were changing color, going on and off. I noticed the annunciators on all four diesel generator control circuits showed ground alarms. I notified the shift engineer of this condition and said I didn't think they would start."

    "At about 1:30, I knew that the reactor water level could not be maintained, and I was concerned about uncovering the core."

    Had the core become uncovered, a meltdown of the reactor fuel would have begun because of the radioactive decay heat in the fuel.

    In order to prevent the reactor water from boiling off, it was necessary to get more water into the core than the single high-pressure control rod drive pump could provide. It was decided that by opening the reactor relief valves, the reactor would be depressurized from 1020 to below 350 pounds per square inch, where a low-pressure pump would be capable of forcing water in to keep the core covered. None of the normal or emergency low-pressure pumps were working, however, so a makeshift arrangement was made, using a condensate booster pump. This was able to provide a temporarily adequate supply of water to the reactor, although the level dropped from its normal 200 inches above the core down to only 48 inches. Using the makeshift system, the Unit 1 reactor was under control for the time being.

    "None of these attempts resulted in establishing torus or reactor shutdown cooling. The attempts were severely limited by dense smoke and inadequate breathing apparatus."

    Why the Fire Fighting Efforts Stalled

    The fire fighting effort was not going well. Soon after the electricians had fled the cable spreader room, a shift engineer had tried to turn on the built-in Cardox system in order to flood the room with carbon dioxide (CO2) and put out the fire. He discovered that the electricians had purposely disabled the electrical system that initiated the Cardox.

    "I tried to use the manual crank system and discovered that it had a metal construction plate on, under the glass, and I tried to remove it. This was difficult, without a screwdriver.... The next day, I checked other manual cardox initiators and found that almost all of them had these construction plates attached."


    He finally got the power on, but the Cardox system ended up driving smoke up into the control room above the cable spreader room. One person present described the scene in the control room as follows:

    "The control room was filling with thick smoke and fumes. The shift engineer and others were choking and coughing on the smoke. It was obvious the control room would have to be evacuated in a very short time unless ventilation was provided."

    After the carbon dioxide system was turned off, the smoke stopped pouring into the control room. It had not put out the fire in the spreading room, however. A safety officer fighting the fire pointed out,

    "The CO2 in the spreader room may have slowed down the fire but it did not put it out. We opened the doors for air, as the smoke in the whole area had become dense and sickening. Another employee and I each donned a breathing apparatus and went into the spreader room. We used hand lamps for illumination, but they penetrated the smoke only a few inches. The neoprene covers on the cables were burning, giving off dense black smoke and sickening fumes.... It was impossible to not swallow some smoke. I got sick several times."

    "Breathing apparatus was in short supply and not all of the Scott air packs were serviceable. Some did not have face masks and others were not fully charged at the time of the start of the fire. The breathing apparatus was recharged from precharged bulk cylinders by pressure equalization. As the pressure in the bulk cylinders decreased, the resulting pressure decrease in the Scott packs limited the length of time that the personnel could remain at the scene of the fire."

    The electrical cables continued to burn for another six hours, because the fire fighting was carried out by plant employees, despite the fact that professional firemen from the Athens, Alabama, fire department had been on the scene since about 1:30 pm. As the Athens fire chief pointed out,

    "I was aware that my effort was in support of, and under the direction of, Browns Ferry plant personnel, but I did recommend, after I saw the fire in the cable spreading room, to put water on it. The Plant Superintendent was not receptive to my ideas.

    "I informed him that this was not an electrical fire and that water could and should be used because CO2 and dry chemical were not proper for this type of fire. The problem was to cool the hot wires to prevent recurring combustion. CO2 and dry chemical were not capable of providing the required cooling. Throughout the afternoon, I continued to recommend the use of water to the Plant Superintendent. He consulted with people over the phone, but apparently was told to continue to use CO2 and dry chemical. Around 6:00 pm, I again suggested the use of water . . . . The Plant Superintendent finally agreed and his men put out the fire in about 20 minutes . . . .

    "They were using type B and C extinguishers on a type A fire; the use of water would have immediately put the fire out."

    Even when the decision to put the fire out with water had been taken, further difficulties developed. The fire hose had not been completely removed from the hose rack, so that full water pressure did not reach the nozzle. The fire-fighters did not know this, however, and decided that the nozzle was defective. They borrowed a nozzle from the Athens fire department,

    "but it had incorrect type threads and would not stay on the hose."

    The spare control rod drive pump was inoperative, and although it was later determined that a series of valves could have been turned to allow the Unit 2 control rod drive pump to supply water for the Unit 1 reactor, the reactor operators did not know this at the time.

    With the reactor pressure mounting higher and higher, the relief valves were finally brought back into operation at 9:50 pm, and about 10:20 pm the reactor was depressurized to the point that the condensate booster pump could again get water into the reactor.

    How the Emergency Planning Worked

    Normal shutdown was established on the Unit 1 reactor at 4:00 am the next morning, and the nightmare at Browns Ferry was over.

    Had the reactor boiloff continued to the point where a core meltdown took place, however, it is doubtful that the endangered surrounding population could have been evacuated in time; evacuation of the county's residents was the responsibility of the Civil Defense Coordinator for Limestone County, but, as he admitted to NRC inspectors,

    "I heard about the fire at Browns Ferry on the morning of Monday, March 24, 1975 (two days later). No one in the Civil Defense System notified me or attempted to do so ... I feel that our county should have been notified since the plant is located in our county."

    The sheriff of Limestone County said:

    "I heard about the fire at the Browns Ferry plant after it was over ... I have not had any updating of procedures proposed to me since the initial plan was outlined in 1972. I do not have a copy of the emergency plan."

    The Sheriff of neighboring Morgan County did hear about the fire four hours after it started, but said,

    "I was asked to keep quiet about the incident to avoid any panic."

    The NRC noted in its investigative report that,

    "No official notification was made to the State of Alabama Highway Patrol by the State of Alabama Department of Public Health or by TVA...

    "An attempt was made to notify the Lawrence County Sheriff at 4:08 pm, but no answer was received. Only one attempt was made to locate the sheriff."

    Large numbers of plant employees went into the plant control room, adding to the chaotic situation there. Instead of the six persons normally there, one assistant shift engineer reported,

    "The maximum number of people in the control room at only one time I guessed to be about 50 to 75."

    Although it is perfectly possible to design an inexpensive anemometer to test for air leaks, or even use smoke from a cigarette, these methods were rejected two years ago by the Browns Ferry plant personnel in favor of using candles.

    Why was Flammable Material Used?

    Some senior personnel at the plant thought that the urethane sheet foam used to seal the cable penetrations was fireproof. The leader of the electrical conduit division at the plant said:

    "The practice of using RTV-102 and sheet foam to seal air leaks has been the practice for two or three years. We believed that the urethane would not sustain a fire. Urethane samples had been tested several years ago and it needed a flame for 20 minutes to sustain a fire."

    They had only tested two of the polyurethane samples, however, using an American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM) test that the Marshall Space Flight Centre later found to be of marginal value. No test had been made of the foam polyurethane, however, and the NRC's consultants, from the Marshall Space Flight Centre, found that,

    "A cursory match test on a piece of the foam rubber disclosed almost instantaneous ignition, very rapid burning, and release of molten flaming drippings."

    Even though some people at the plant thought the ASTM tests showed the penetration sealant material to be non-flammable, senior management knew it was highly flammable. The plant instrument engineer told NRC inspectors that,

    "During the test and startup period of Unit #1 (in 1973), I demonstrated the flammability of the sealing material to the Plant Superintendent. I burned the material in the Plant Superintendent's office. He immediately called someone with Construction and they discussed the situation .... I feel the Plant Superintendent did all that was immediately possible to investigate the situation as it appeared that construction was not going to change the material."

    The Plant Superintendent admitted to the NRC inspectors,

    "I was aware that polyurethane was flammable, but it never occurred to me that these penetrations were being tested using candles."

    Many senior management personnel at the plant denied knowing of the practice of using candles to test cable penetrations.

    The rest indicated that they knew candles were being used, but thought the sealant materials were not flammable.

    The electricians seemed to be the only group who knew both that the foam rubber was flammable and that candles were being used as the testing method. As one electrician later recounted,

    "The electrical engineer called the group (of electricians) together and warned us how hazardous this method was. 'Why just the other day,' the electrical engineer said (in effect), 'I caught some of that foam on fire and put it out with my bare hands, burning them in the process.'"

    One of the electricians who started the fire said that candles had been used for more than two years but said,

    "I thought that everybody knew that the material we were using to seal our leaks in penetrations would burn....I never did like it."

    How the Warnings Were Ignored

    The real irony of the Browns Ferry fire was that two days before, a similar fire had started but had been put out successfully. After the fire on Thursday night, the shift engineers and three assistant shift engineers met. According to one of them,

    "We discussed among the group the procedure of using lighted candles to check for air leaks. Our conclusion was that the procedure should be stopped."

    Yet nothing was done. The fire was noted in the plant log, and briefly discussed the next day at the plant management meeting. No one on the management level seemed to consider it a safety problem worth following up. This was the standard operating procedure; as the NRC investigative report notes,

    "Previous fires in the polyurethane foam materials had not always been reported to the appropriate levels of management, and, on the occasions when reported, no action was taken to prevent recurrence."

    In the face of these practices, it was probably nor a question of whether the Browns Ferry plant would have a major fire, but when.

    Has Anything Been Learned?

    What will the fire mean for other nuclear plants? That depends on whether the NRC carries out the recommendation made by the Factory Mutual Engineering Association of Norwood, Massachusetts, the fire underwriters the NRC engaged as consultants:

    "Conclusions and Recommendations:

    "The original plant design did not adequately evaluate the fire hazards of grouped electrical cables in trays, grouped cable trays and materials of construction (wall sealants) in accordance with recognized industrial 'highly protected risk' criteria....

    "It is obvious that vital electrical circuitry controlling critical safe shutdown functions and control of more than one production unit were located in an area where normal and redundant controls were susceptible to a single localized accident .... A re-evaluation should be made of the arrangement of important electrical circuitry and control systems, to establish that safe shutdown controls in the normal and redundant systems are routed in separated and adequately protected areas."

    Every nuclear plant in the country uses a cable spreader room below its control room. Despite requirements for separation and redundancy of reactor protection and control systems, every reactor has been permitted to go into operation with this sort of configuration which lends itself to a single failure's wiping out all redundant systems.

    If every plant currently operating and under construction were required to re-wire so as to achieve true redundancy and eliminate cable trays bunched together, I have made calculations that indicate the cost will range between $7,680,000,000 and $12,343,000,000. It will be interesting to see whether the new commissioners of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will require such changes.

    Except for one news release, written March 27, 1975, NRC headquarters in Washington has remained silent about Browns Ferry. That news release, quoted below, does not make one optimistic that any meaningful lesson has been learned from the Browns Ferry incident.

    "The functioning of some in-plant operating and safety systems, including emergency core cooling systems, was impaired due to damage to the cables.

    "The two reactors were safely shut down and cooled during the fire. NRC inspectors report that there was redundant cooling equipment available during the reactor cooldown....

    "Although some instrumentation was lost, certain critical instrumentation such as reactor water level, temperature and pressure indicators continued to function and both plants were safely shut down....

    "On Unit 1, although a loss-of-coolant accident had not occurred, the emergency core cooling system was activated and supplied additional water to the reactor. It was manually shut down to prevent overfilling. Later, during cooldown, when ECCS was called for manually as one of the several alternate means of supply cooling water, it did not activate; the alternate methods had more than sufficient capability to cool the core."

    Whether the NRC has sufficient capability to cool the public's reaction, once the facts about Browns Ferry are known, will be interesting to observe.

    You are quite right about the YAG laser producing the effect speedily, but I believe that once established even the flourescent lights in the lab will trigger muon emissions.

    It would be interesting to make a set up similar to a fluorescent light bulb with hydrogen in it (and with the mercury) and try different input frequencies to see if excess energy is produced.


    1) Sveinn Olafsson (laser + potassium + iron oxide + hydrogen) is using 1064 nm Nd:YAG laser to produce high energy particles.


    2) ASML's lithography chip making machine (laser + tin + hydrogen) is also using 1064 nm Nd:YAG and a 10600 nm CO2 laser to produce 12-16 nm EUV. See the attached photo. Notice that ASML's data shows a peak at 13.5 nm and steep drop off that intersects zero at about 12 nm.

    see slide 19 here:

    https://strobe.colorado.edu/wp-content/uploads/STROBE_ASML-EUV-Sources_Purvis_25-Sept-2020-1.pdf


    3) Brilliant Light Power (BrLP) (electric discharges + tin + hydrogen) has an emitted spectrum that also drops off to zero around 10 nm. I could not find a spectrum from BrLP's suncell in the 10 nm range but BrLP shows spectrums from years ago from electrical discharges that show the electromagnetic spectrum intersection with zero power at 10 nm (meaning very few photons are made with wavelengths shorter than 10 nm).


    So all three have infrared radiation, metals and hydrogen in common and are getting interesting results.

    Sveinn Olafsson process (potassium, iron oxide surface + hydrogen and a laser, correct?) and Brilliant Light Power's (molten tin and electrical discharges) light production is similar to the ASML chip making machines that create EUV (EUV peak somewhere between 3 and 7 nm [Edit, actually it might longer than this] but I have not found a good source of info on this) from 50,000 laser pulses per second + molten tin droplet + hydrogen.


    EUV Challenges And Unknowns At 3nm and Below
    Rising costs, complexity, and fuzzy delivery schedules are casting a cloud over next-gen lithography.
    semiengineering.com

    quoting:

    EUV is complicated. In operation, laser pulses are generated. In the system, the pulses hit tiny tin droplets at high speeds, creating photons. Photons bounce off several mirrors within the scanner. Then, photons reflect off the mask and onto the wafer for patterning.


    Inside the machine that saved Moore’s Law
    The Dutch firm ASML spent $9 billion and 17 years developing a way to keep making denser computer chips.
    www.technologyreview.com


    EUV Challenges And Unknowns At 3nm and Below
    Rising costs, complexity, and fuzzy delivery schedules are casting a cloud over next-gen lithography.
    semiengineering.com

    To create EUV light, Cymer uses an approach called laser-produced plasma, which fires 50,000 microscopic droplets a second of ultrapure molten tin across a vacuum chamber, hitting each with powerful CO2-laser light generated by a series of amplifiers derived from a design originally used for metal cutting. When a laser pulse hits a molten tin droplet, it heats it up into an EUV-emitting plasma. A collector mirror reflects light created in this process and casts it into the scanner. Because the approach generates EUV light as well as tin debris, hydrogen gas constantly flows across the collector mirror to keep it from being rapidly covered with a layer of tin.

    “The first time I heard about it, I thought it was insane,” admits ASML’s Alberto Pirati, who joined the company’s EUV light-source program in early 2013. But little by little, the team achieved the seemingly impossible. One of the biggest breakthroughs came with the introduction of a technique the Cymer team began exploring before being acquired by ASML. They found that if they fired a “prepulse” before the main laser, they could flatten each tin droplet into a pancake, creating more surface area for the main laser to hit and increasing how much of the tin droplet was converted to plasma. The change has boosted the laser-to-EUV conversion efficiency from a meager 1 percent to some 5 percent. Earlier this year, thanks to the prepulse and other optimizations, ASML reported that it had reached 200 W in the lab. Another light-source developer, Gigaphoton, has also reported great progress. The long-awaited production target of 250 W no longer seems far off. But the true test of whether EUV is ready to go into production will happen in the labs and fabs—and spreadsheets—of ASML’s chipmaking customers.

    If so, this opens up the proverbial can-of-worms. Everything we have been told based on the PCR tests would have to be reevaluated...reported case numbers, and deaths attributed to COVID for starters.


    Worthy enough news not to be relegated mostly to obscure websites.

    If more than 80% of positives were false positives then that would be a huge problem. It must only be some limited numbers of machines that give that many false positives (i.e. more than 80%). I did some digging but haven't reached any conclusions.


    https://www.medpagetoday.com/infectiousdisease/covid19/90508


    So how does a qualitative RT-PCR test work? Basically, the manufacturer sets the test to turn off the cycling or amplification process when a certain number is hit. For a qualitative test set at 40, after 40 amplification cycles, if any viral material is detected, it turns off and is reported as positive. If none is detected, it would be reported as negative. If the number of amplification cycles was really 15 or 25, it would still run until it gets to 40 and be reported as positive.

    With these type of tests, it's critical to use an agreed-upon cycle threshold value such as 33 (CDC) or 35 (Dr. Fauci) rather than setting it at a potentially misleading 40 or 45. Many of the current tests in use are preset by the manufacturer to these higher numbers.

    The World Health Organization issued a notice last week telling the labs "the cut-off should be manually adjusted to ensure that specimens with high Ct values are not incorrectly assigned SARS-CoV-2 detected due to background noise." Could this be a reason why many people test positive but remain asymptomatic? In that same memo, WHO said all labs should report the cycle threshold value to treating physicians.

    A quantitative test is designed to come up with the actual cycle threshold value as the cycling process turns off when detecting any virus. There is not a preset value, so a quantitative measure is obtained. A test that registers a positive result after 12 rounds of amplification for a Ct value of 12 starts out with 10 million times as much viral genetic material as a sample with a Ct value of 35. Above that level, Fauci has said the test is just finding destroyed nucleotides, not virus capable of replicating.

    Jed, why do you say the Ivermectin study you referenced was a negative result? You need to look more carefully at the data.

    RobertBryant, It's hard to find the results in the link you provided (it might not be there at all as far as I can see). But here is a report on that study by Dr. Ahmed Elgazzar from Egypt:

    https://trialsitenews.com/benh…-covid-19-as-prophylaxis/


    Involving 600 subjects, the study design split the patients by 400 symptomatic patients confirmed with COVID-19; 200 health care and house hold contacts distributed over 6 groups including summarized by the following:

    Dr. Ahmed Elgazzar and team reported that among health care and household contacts, the use of Ivermectin materially reduced the incidence of both infections in health care as well as household contacts down to 2%, compared to 10% in the non-Ivermectin group.

    $$$$$$$$$$ :love: instead of 7£ for a cure + antibody protection with Ivermectin. This simply is nuts!

    We must fix the interface to animal like minded people that for greed only suppress working treatment of CoV-19.


    Further we should jail people like Fauci, that did finance criminal Wuhan research that did lead to the CoV-19 pandemic. But Biden will uphold him, what is a severe sign of future planned manipulations.

    Fauci made Trump look bad .... and Trump supporters wrote negative things about Fauci as retaliation. I wouldn't put much faith in anything written in news media about Fauci that is negative.